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October 1, 2018
Mr. Brent J. Fields
Secretary
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, Northeast
Washington, DC 20549
Dear Mr. Fields:
Enclosed is a petition for a rulemaking on environmental, social, and governance (ESG)
disclosure authored by Osler Chair in Business Law Cynthia A. Williams, Osgoode Hall Law
School, and Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law Jill E. Fisch, University of
Pennsylvania Law School, and signed by investors and associated organizations representing
more than $5 trillion in assets under management including the California Public Employees'
Retirement System (CalPERS), New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli, Illinois State
Treasurer Michael W. Frerichs, Connecticut State Treasurer Denise L. Nappier, Oregon State
Treasurer Tobias Read, and the U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment.
The enclosed rulemaking petition:







Calls for the Commission to initiate notice and comment rulemaking to develop a
comprehensive framework requiring issuers to disclose identified environmental, social,
and governance (ESG) aspects of each public-reporting company’s operations;
Lays out the statutory authority for the SEC to require ESG disclosure;
Discusses the clear materiality of ESG issues;
Highlights large asset managers’ existing calls for standardized ESG disclosure;
Discusses the importance of such standardized ESG disclosure for companies and the
competitive position of the U.S. capital markets; and
Points to the existing rulemaking petitions, investor proposals, and stakeholder
engagements on human capital management, climate, tax, human rights, gender pay
ratios, and political spending, and highlights how these efforts suggest, in aggregate, that
it is time for the SEC to bring coherence to this area.

If the Commission or Staff have any questions, or if we can be of assistance in any way, please
contact either Osler Chair in Business Law Cynthia A. Williams, Osgoode Hall Law School,
who can be reached at (416) 736-5545, or by electronic mail at cwilliams@osgoode.yorku.ca; or
Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law Jill E. Fisch, University of
Pennsylvania Law School, who can be reached at (215) 746-3454, or by electronic mail at
jfisch@law.upenn.edu.

October 1, 2018
Mr. Brent J. Fields
Secretary
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, Northeast
Washington, DC 20549
Dear Mr. Fields,
We respectfully submit this petition for rulemaking pursuant to Rule 192(a) of the Securities
and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Rule of Practice.1
Today, investors, including retail investors, are demanding and using a wide range of
information designed to understand the long-term performance and risk management strategies
of public-reporting companies. In response to changing business norms and pressure from
investors, most of America’s largest public companies are attempting to provide additional
information to meet these changing needs and to address worldwide investor preferences and
regulatory requirements. Without adequate standards, more and more public companies are
voluntarily producing “sustainability reports” designed to explain how they are creating longterm value. There are substantial problems with the nature, timing, and extent of these voluntary
disclosures, however. Thus, we respectfully ask the Commission to engage in notice and
comment rule-making to develop a comprehensive framework for clearer, more consistent, more
complete, and more easily comparable information relevant to companies’ long-term risks and
performance. Such a framework would better inform investors, and would provide clarity to
America’s public companies on providing relevant, auditable, and decision-useful information to
investors.
Introduction
In 2014, the Commission solicited public comments to its “Disclosure Effectiveness”
initiative, which sought to evaluate and potentially reform corporate disclosure requirements.
Over 9,835 commenters have responded to that initiative.2 As part of that initiative, the 2016
Concept Release on Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K (“Concept
Release”)3 solicited public opinions on the frequency and format of current disclosure, company
accounting practices and standards, and the substantive issues about which information should be
disclosed. In that Concept Release, the SEC asked a number of questions about whether it should
require disclosure of sustainability matters, which it defined as “encompass[ing] a range of
topics, including climate change, resource scarcity, corporate social responsibility, and good

1

Rule 192. Rulemaking: Issuance, Amendment and Repeal of Rules, Rule 192(a), By Petition, available at
https://www.sec.gov/about/rules-of-practice-2016.pdf.
2
See Tyler Gellasch, Joint Report: Towards a Sustainable Economy: A review of Comments to the SEC’s Disclosure
Effectiveness Concept Release, 14 (Sept. 2016), [hereinafter “Gellasch Joint Report”], available at:
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/583f3fca725e25fcd45aa446/t/5866d3c0725e25a97292ae03/1483133890503/S
ustainable-Economy-report-final.pdf.
3
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Release No. 33-10064; 34-77599; File No. S7-0616, April 16, 2016, available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2016/33-10064.pdf [hereinafter “Concept
Release”].
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corporate citizenship. These topics are characterized broadly as ESG [Environmental, Social, and
Governance] concerns.”4
The SEC received over 26,500 comments in response to the 2016 Concept Release, making it
one of only seven major proposals by the SEC since 2008 to garner more than 25,000
comments.5 As noted in a report reviewing comments to the Concept Release, “the
overwhelming response to the Concept Release seems to reflect an enormous pent up demand by
disclosure recipients for more and better disclosure” generally.6 The Concept Release also
provided the first formal opportunity since the mid-1970s for both reporting companies and
disclosure recipients to convey their views to the SEC concerning what additional environmental
or social information should be disclosed to complement the governance disclosure already
required.
An analysis of the comments submitted in response to the Concept Release, a significant
majority of which supported better ESG disclosure, can be found in the report referenced in
footnote 2. Across the board, commenters noted how they were using those disclosures to
understand companies’ potential long-term performance and risks. The response to the Concept
Release strongly suggests that it is time for the Commission to engage in a rulemaking process to
develop a framework for public reporting companies to use to disclose specific, much higherquality ESG information than is currently being produced pursuant either to voluntary initiatives
or current SEC requirements.
We briefly set out six arguments supporting this petition:
(1) The SEC has clear statutory authority to require disclosure of ESG information, and
doing so will promote market efficiency, protect the competitive position of American
public companies and the U.S. capital markets, and enhance capital formation;
(2) ESG information is material to a broad range of investors today;
(3) Companies struggle to provide investors with ESG information that is relevant, reliable,
and decision-useful;
(4) Companies’ voluntary ESG disclosure is episodic, incomplete, incomparable, and
inconsistent, and ESG disclosure in required SEC filings is similarly inadequate;
(5) Commission rulemaking will reduce the current burden on public companies and provide
a level playing field for the many American companies engaging in voluntary ESG
disclosure; and
(6) Petitions and stakeholder engagement seeking different kinds of ESG information
suggest, in aggregate, that it is time for the SEC to regulate in this area.
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See id. at 206.
Id.
6
See Joint Report, supra note 2, at 10.
5
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1. The SEC has Clear Statutory Authority to Require Disclosure of ESG Information
As acknowledged by the SEC in its Concept Release, its statutory authority over disclosure
is broad. Congress, in both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, “authorize[d] the
Commission to promulgate rules for registrant disclosure ‘as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.’”7 In an early defense of its power to require
disclosure of corporate governance information such as the committee structure and
composition of boards of directors—disclosure now considered standard, but which was
controversial when the requirements were first promulgated—the SEC was explicit about the
broad scope of its power over disclosure:
The legislative history of the federal securities laws reflects a recognition that
disclosure, by providing corporate owners with meaningful information about the way
in which their corporations are managed, may promote the accountability of corporate
managers. . . . Accordingly, although the Commission’s objective in adopting these
rules is to provide additional information relevant to an informed voting decision, it
recognizes that disclosure may, depending on determinations made by a company’s
management, directors and shareholders, influence corporate conduct. This sort of
impact is clearly consistent with the basic philosophy of the federal securities laws.8
In 1996, Congress added Section 2(b) to the Securities Act of 1933, and Section 23(a)(2) to
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. These parallel sections provide that:
Whenever pursuant to this title the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is
required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.9
These statutory policy goals underscore the SEC’s authority to require disclosure of better,
more easily comparable, and consistently presented ESG information. Generally, the SEC
seeks to protect investors through requirements for issuers to disclose material information at
specified times.10 Thus, the investor protection aspect of the SEC’s statutory authority will be
discussed in Part Two, below, in conjunction with the discussion of the materiality of ESG
information. Here we discuss why requiring issuers to disclose specified ESG information
would promote market efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

7

Concept Release, supra note 3, at 22-23 & fn. 50, citing Sections 7, 10, and 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77g(a)(10), 77j, and 77s(a); and Sections 3(b), 12, 13, 14, 15(d), and 23(a) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(b), 78l, 78m(a), 78n(a), 78o(d), and 78w(a).
8
Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate
Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 15,384, 16 Docket 348, 350 (Dec. 6, 1978).
9
Securities Act of 1933, §2(b), 15 U.S.C.§ 77b(b); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 23(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§78w(a)(2)(2012).
10
See Concept Release, supra note 3, at 23 (stating that “our disclosure rules are intended not only to protect
investors but also to facilitate capital formation and maintain fair, orderly and efficient capital markets.”).

3

A. Promoting Efficient Capital Markets
The concept of “efficient capital markets” includes informational efficiency (market
mechanisms able to process new information quickly and with broad distribution)11 and allocative
efficiency (distributing capital resources to their highest value use at the lowest cost and risk).12
Disclosure is obviously relevant to both efficiency goals, the latter being particularly relevant to
the discussion of the need for better sustainability disclosure. As Mark Carney, Governor of the
Bank of England and Chair of the Financial Stability Board, said with respect to climate change,
with “consistent, comparable, reliable, and clear disclosure” of firms’ forward-looking strategies,
both “markets and governments” can better manage the transition to a low-carbon future by
supporting the allocation of capital to its risk-adjusted highest-value use in that transition.13
Climate change is not a purely environmental issue, of course: It is also an issue that poses
material risks and opportunities to companies in most industries. The Sustainability Accounting
Standards Board (“SASB”)’s conclusion, developed in conjunction with industry leaders, is that
72 of 79 industries, representing 93% of U.S. capital market valuations, are vulnerable to
material financial implications from climate change.14 The point is that without consistent,
comparable, reliable, and complete information, capital markets are constrained in promoting
allocational efficiency as many industries embark on the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Similarly, other substantial social and economic challenges in the United States, such as
increasingly precarious work environments, rising economic inequality, or the security of private
information, can be better perceived by investors and assets allocated to high-performance
workplaces and firms with better human capital management and cybersecurity arrangements if
investors are provided with clear and comparable information about these matters.
Requiring firms to disclose more ESG information is thus consistent with the SEC’s
authority to promote market efficiency, and within its broad mandate “to promulgate rules for
registrant disclosure as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.”15
B. Ensuring the global competitiveness of America’s public companies and the U.S.
capital markets
The SEC will also be ensuring the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets and America’s
public companies by requiring more ESG disclosure. Many other developed countries have
already promulgated such requirements, shaping the expectations of global investors. A 2016
study by the U.N. PRI (Principles for Responsible Investment) and MSCI (a global data and
investment research provider) identified 300 policy initiatives promoting sustainable finance in
the world’s 50 largest economies, of which 200 were corporate reporting requirements covering
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See Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK L.REV. 763, 764–65 (1995).
See Alicia J. Davis, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (2009) (recognizing that
“[p]ublic markets perform a vital economic role, since accurate share prices lead to the efficient allocation of
capital.”).
13
Mark Carney, Governor, Breaking the tragedy of the horizon: Climate change and financial stability, Bank of
England 14 (Sept. 29, 2015), available at
http://www.BankofEngland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2015/844.asp#.
14
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, Climate Risk—Technical Bulletin, SASB Library 2017, available at
https://library.sasb.org/climate-risk-technical-bulletin/.
15
Concept Release, supra note 3, at 22.
12

4

environmental, social, and governance factors.16 According to a 2015 report by the Initiative for
Responsible Investment of the Hauser Institute for Civil Society at the Kennedy School, Harvard
University, 23 countries have enacted legislation within the last 15 years to require public
companies to issue reports including environmental and/or social information.17
In addition to these reporting initiatives, seven stock exchanges require social and/or
environmental disclosure as part of their listing requirements: Australia’s ASX, Brazil’s
Bovespa, India’s Securities and Exchange Board, the Bursa Malaysia, Oslo’s Børs, the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and the London Stock Exchange.18
Moreover, seven countries have enacted policies following those of the U.K. and Sweden,
which since 2000 have required public pension funds to disclose the extent to which the fund
incorporates social and environmental information into their investment decisions.19 Regulations
such as these support the trend of increasing institutional investor demand for high-quality ESG
data, as discussed below. Currently the European Union is developing a taxonomy of
environmentally sustainable activities, as well as developing benchmarks for low-carbon
investment strategies, and regulatory guidance to improve corporate disclosure of climate-related
information.20 To the extent that US companies fail to disclose information which global
investors are being encouraged, and in some cases required, to consider, they will be at a
disadvantage in attracting capital from some of the world’s largest financial markets. This
highlights that US corporate reporting standards will soon become outdated if they are not
revised to incorporate global developments regarding the materiality and disclosure of ESG
information.
C. Facilitating Capital Formation
Additionally, promulgating a regulatory framework for the disclosure of ESG information
would promote capital formation. By providing more information to investors, giving better
information about risks and opportunities, and standardizing what is currently an uncoordinated
and irregular universe of ESG disclosures, the SEC would act to increase confidence in the
capital markets. This confidence may well mobilize sources of capital from investors who are
currently unwilling to invest given knowledge gaps or information asymmetries. Particularly
retail investors, who are important as long-term investors and investors in small and medium
enterprises, may be emboldened by a clearer sense of the social and environmental aspects of

16

PRI and MSCI, Global Guide to Responsible Investment Regulation, 2016, available at
https://www.unpri.org/page/responsible-investment-regulation.
17
See Initiative for Responsible Investment, Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Efforts by National
Governments and Stock Exchanges (March 12, 2015), available at http://hausercenter.org/iri/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/CR-3-12-15.pdf. These countries include Argentina, China, Denmark, the EU, Ecuador,
Finland, France, Germany Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland (specific to state-supported financial
institutions after the 2008 financial crisis), Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Taiwan, and the U.K.
18
See id.
19
See Initiative for Responsible Investment report, supra note 63. These countries include Australia, Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan.
20
Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance (TEG), State-of-play, July 2018, available at
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/sustainable-finance-technical-expert-group_en.
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companies’ activities as a guide to companies’ longer-term risks and opportunities.21 As we
highlight below, the value of assets under management based on ESG-influenced guidelines has
grown considerably in the past two decades. We ask the SEC to act to facilitate the provision of
information to this rapidly growing sector. In so doing, additional capital may become available
to support America’s enterprises, particularly its smaller and medium-sized enterprises.
2. ESG Information is Material and Decision Useful
In advancing its over-arching goals of investor protection and promoting market efficiency,
the SEC has relied upon the concept of materiality to determine what information issuers should
be required to disclose and in what format.22 As defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in TSC v.
Northway, material information is information that a “reasonable shareholder would consider
important in deciding how to vote.”23 As the Court said, “[p]ut another way, there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”24 Thus, what is material depends on reasonable investors’ perceptions of what
information is already available in the market, and how any new or omitted information changes
those perceptions of the quality of management, when voting or engaging with management, or
the value of a company or its shares, when investing or selling.
In promulgating disclosure regulations under Regulation S-K, the SEC has predominantly,
but not exclusively, sought to require the disclosure of information it construes as financially
material.25 Recent investment industry analyses are confirming the financial materiality of much
ESG information. For instance, a June, 2017, Bank of America Merrill Lynch study highlighted
by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board found sustainability factors to be “strong
indicators of future volatility, earnings risk, price declines, and bankruptcies.”26 Also in June of
2017, Allianz Global Investors produced a research report with similar findings, concluding that
the heightened transparency of ESG disclosure lowered companies’ cost of capital by reducing
the “investment risk premium” that sophisticated investors would require.27 In September of
2017, Nordea Equity Research published an analytic research report concluding that there is
“solid evidence that ESG matters, both for operational and share price performance.”28 Goldman
Sachs concluded in April of 2018 that “integrating ESG factors allows for greater insight into

21

See Davis, supra note 12, at 116-1120 for evidence on the importance of retail investors to small and medium
enterprises, versus institutional investors which predominantly invest in large-capitalization companies; and for
evidence of retail investors generally longer holding periods for shares of stock.
22
Concept Release, supra note 3, at 33-34.
23
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
24
Id.
25
See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1264-66 (1999) (discussing SEC’s requirements for public companies to disclose certain
corporate governance information without a showing of economic materiality).
26
Bank of American Merrill Lynch, Equity Strategy Focus Point—ESG Part II: A Deeper Dive (June 15, 2017),
cited in Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), The State of Disclosure Report 2017 (December 2017).
27
Allianz Global Investors, ESG matters, Part 2: Added value or a mere marketing tool?What does ESG mean for
investments?, (June 2017).
28
Nordea Equity Research, Strategy & Quant: Cracking the ESG Code, 5 Sept. 2017, available at:
https://nordeamarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Strategy-and-quant_executive-summary_050917.pdf.
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intangible factors such as culture, operational excellence and risk that can improve investment
outcomes.”29
These industry studies are consistent with, and indeed rely upon, a number of influential
academic studies that have analyzed the over 2,000 research studies also showing the economic
materiality of ESG information. Two such studies are of particular note. Deutsch Asset & Wealth
Management, in conjunction with researchers from the University of Hamburg, analyzed 2,250
individual studies of the relationship between ESG data and corporate financial performance.
From this analysis, the researchers concluded that improvements in ESG performance generally
lead to improvements in financial performance.30 A comprehensive review published in 2015 of
empirical studies found that 90% of studies show that sound sustainability standards lower firms’
cost of capital; 80% of studies show that companies’ stock price performance is positively
influenced by good sustainability practices; and 88% of studies show that better E, S, or G
practices result in better operational performance.31
In addition, the SEC has promulgated disclosure requirements for the production of
qualitatively material information. For instance, it has required disclosure concerning corporate
governance, such as statistics on board members’ attendance at meetings, and information on the
committee structure of the board of directors, with the stated purpose of encouraging the board to
be more active and independent in monitoring management’s actions.32 It has required extensive
disclosure of executive compensation, starting in the early 1990s, as a response to public
frustration with the levels of executive compensation.33 Indeed, with respect to illegal actions by
members of management or the company, the SEC has established an almost per se materiality
standard even where the economic consequences of management’s illegal actions were trivial.34
This qualitative approach to the materiality of information concerning the honesty of
management or its approach to law compliance, among other matters, was the basis for the
SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance and the Office of the Chief Accountant to reject
29

Goldman Sachs Equity Research, GS Sustain ESG Series: A Revolution Rising-From Low Chatter to Loud Roar
[Redacted], 23 April 2018 (analyzing earnings call transcripts, social media, asset manager initiatives, and rising
assets under management utilizing ESG screens to conclude that “the ESG Revolution is just beginning, as the
logical, empirical and anecdotal evidence for its importance continue to mount.”).
30
Deutsche Asset & Wealth Management, ESG and Corporate Financial Performance: Mapping the Global
Landscape, December, 2015, available at
https://institutional.deutscheam.com/content/_media/K15090_Academic_Insights_UK_EMEA_RZ_Online_151201
_Final_(2).pdf.
31
See Gordon L. Clark, Andreas Feiner & Michael Viehs, From the Stockholder to the Stakeholder: How
Sustainability Can Drive Financial Outperformance (2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2508281. This report is an excellent resource because it analyzes
the empirical literature on the financial effects of sustainability initiatives by type of initiative (E, S or G) and by
various financial measures of interest (cost of debt capital; cost of equity capital; operating performance; and effect
on stock prices).
32
See Williams, supra note 24, at 1265 & fn. 359, citing Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in
the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 15,384, 16 Docket
348 (Dec. 6, 1978).
33
See id. at 1266 & fn. 363, citing Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, Exchange
Act Release No. 31,327, 52 SEC Docket 1961 (Nov. 4, 1992).
34
See id. at 1265 & fn. 361, citing Division of Corporation Finance’s Views and Comments on Disclosure Relating
to the Making of Illegal Campaign Contributions by Public Companies and/or their Officers and Directors,
Securities Act Release No. 5466, Exchange Act Release No. 10673, 3 SEC Docket 647 (Mar. 19, 1974); In re
Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 172 (1964) (Cary, Chair)(stating that the integrity of management “is always a
material factor.”).
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quantitative benchmarks as the sole determinant to assess materiality in preparing financial
statements.35
The Commission has often developed new disclosure requirements in response to increased
investor interest in emerging systemic environmental or social risks, such as its 2011 guidance
on disclosure of risks related to cybersecurity.36 We thus conclude that the SEC properly
recognizes that there can be material information which is not yet required to be reflected in
financial statements but which may be decision-relevant to investors. As stated by Alan Beller,
former Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, “[i]n today’s rapidly changing business
landscape, investors often look beyond financial statement to understand how companies create
long-term value. Financial reporting today has not kept pace with both company managers and
investors’ interest in broader categories of information that are also material to operations and
financial performance.” 37 The touchstone is the “reasonable investor,” and what information the
reasonable investor relies upon in voting, investing, and engagement with portfolio companies.
Today, investors with $68.4 trillion of capital are committed to incorporating ESG factors in
their investing and voting decisions as part of the U.N. PRI.38 Institutions, pension funds,
sovereign wealth funds, and mutual funds with $95 trillion of invested capital support the Carbon
Disclosure Project’s (“CDP”) annual survey of global companies regarding their greenhouse gas
emissions and strategies for addressing climate change.39 According to a recent Ernst & Young
report, “investor interest in non-financial information spans across all sectors,” and 61.5% of
investors consider non-financial information relevant to their investments overall.40
Global assets under management utilizing sustainability screens, ESG factors, and
comparable SRI corporate engagement strategies were valued at $22.89 trillion at the start of
2016, comprising 26% of all professionally managed assets globally.41 Moreover, U.S.domiciled assets using SRI strategies in 2016 were valued at $8.72 trillion, comprising more
than 21% of the assets under professional management in the U.S. in that year.42 These latter
data starkly contrast with the facts when the SEC last considered the issue of expanded social
and environmental disclosure in comprehensive fashion, between 1971 and 1975. Then, there
were two active “ethical funds” in the United States, which by 1975 collectively held only
$18.6 million assets under management, or 0.0005% of mutual fund assets.43
The data in the last two paragraphs indicate that substantial assets under management are
35

See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99-Materiality (Aug. 12, 1999).
Securities & Exchange Comm’n, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Topic No. 2
Cybersecurity (Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm.
37
Alan Beller, Foreword to SASB’s Inaugural Annual State of Disclosure Report, December 1, 2016, available at
https://www.sasb.org/blog-alan-beller-pens-forward-inaugural-annual-state-disclosure-report.
38
See PRI-11 year growth of AO, all signatories (Asset Owners, Investment Managers and service providers) and
respective AUM, Excel sheet available for download at About the PRI, U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment,
http://www.unpri.org/about.
39
Catalyzing business and government action, Carbon Disclosure project, https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Pages/AboutUs.aspx.
40
Id. at 18.
41
See Global Sustainable Investment Alliance, The Global Sustainable Investment Review 2016 3, 7-8, available at
http://www.gsi-alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/GSIA_Review_2016.pdf.
42
Sustainable and Impact Investing in the United States: Overview, US SIF,
http://www.ussif.org/files/Infographics/Overview%20Infographic.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2017).
43
See Williams, supra note 24, at 1267 (citing SEC data).
36

8

using what ESG data is available, clearly demonstrating that investors consider this
information material.44 And yet, as discussed below, leading U.S. asset managers and
executives emphasize that the poor quality of ESG data does not meet investors’ needs, and
support regulatory mandates to require companies to produce better ESG data.
3. Companies struggle to provide investors with ESG information that is relevant,
reliable, and decision-useful
Over the last twenty-five years, voluntary disclosure of ESG information, and voluntary
frameworks for that disclosure, have proliferated to meet the demands for information from
investors, consumers, and civil society. The most comprehensive source of data on ESG
reporting is that done by KPMG in the Netherlands. KPMG published its first ESG report in
1993, and its most recent report in 2017. In 1993, 12% of the top 100 companies in the OECD
countries (excluding Japan) published an environmental or social report.45 By 2017, 83% of the
top 100 companies in the Americas publish a corporate responsibility report, as do 77% of top
100 companies in Europe and 78% in Asia.46 Of the largest 250 companies globally, reporting
rates are 93%.47 The Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) voluntary, multi-stakeholder framework
for ESG reporting has emerged as the clear global benchmark: 75% of the Global 250 use GRI as
the basis for their corporate responsibility reporting.48 Of particular note, 67% of the Global 250
now have their reports “assured,” most often by the major accontancy firms.49
Although 75% of the Global 250 use GRI as the basis for reporting, academic studies of
reporting according to GRI have found serious problems with the quality of the information
being disclosed. One study comparing GRI reports in the automotive industry concluded that
“the information . . . is of limited practical use . . .Thus, quantitative data are not always gathered
systematically and reported completely, while qualitative information appears unbalanced.”50
Markus Milne, Amanda Ball, and Rob Gray surveyed the existing literature on GRI as a
preeminent example of triple bottom line reporting, and concluded in 2013 that “the quality—
and especially the completeness—of many triple bottom line reports are not high. . . With a few
notable exceptions, the reports cover few stakeholders, cherry pick elements of news, and
generally ignore the major social issues that arise from corporate activity….”51 Other studies
have observed similar problems, particularly with the lack of comparability of the information

44

For further evidence of investors’ views on the materiality of ESG data, see Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability
Disclosure Sustainable, GEO. L. J. (forthcoming 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3233053.
45
See Ans Kolk, A Decade of Sustainability Reporting: Developments and Significance, 3 INT’L J. ENVIR. &
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 51, 52 Figure 1 (2004). KPMG has changed the format of the report since its original
1993 report, so direct comparisons are not possible between the Global 250 in 1993 and the Global 250 in 2017.
46
KPMG, The KPMG Survey of CR Reporting 2017, at 11, available at
https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/campaigns/csr/pdf/CSR_Reporting_2017.pdf.
47
Id.
48
See id. at 28. The Global Reporting Initiative is now in its fourth iteration. It has been developed by, and is used
by, thousands of companies, governments, and non-profit entities around the world to report on the economic,
environmental, social and governance effects of entities’ actions. See Global Reporting Initiative, available at
http://www.globalreporting.org.
49
See KPMG 2017 Report, supra note 42, at 26.
50
Klaus Dingwerth & Margot Eichinger, Tamed Transparency: How Information Disclosure under the Global
Reporting Initiative fails to Empower, 10:3 GLOBAL ENV. POL. 74, 88 (2010).
51
Markus J. Milne, Amanda Ball & Rob Gray, Wither Ecology? The Triple Bottom Line, the Global Reporting
Initiative, and the Institutionalization of Corporate Sustainability Reporting,188 (1) J. BUS. ETHICS 1 (2013).
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being reported.52 These conclusions should not be taken as a criticism of GRI per se, or of
companies’ efforts to provide expanded ESG information. Rather, these conclusions are an
indication of the weaknesses of voluntary disclosure: without a regulatory mandate, the
information being produced is often incomplete, lacks consistency, and is not comparable
between companies. In contrast, when ESG disclosure becomes mandatory, standards become
clearer and reporting becomes more consistent and comparable.53 In analogous circumstances,
the SEC has recognized the importance of standardized disclosure frameworks for financial
information, expressing concerns about the use of non-GAAP accounting, concluding that
information being disclosed without adherence to the standardized disclosure framework of U.S.
GAAP may be confusing and even deceptive.54
4. Companies’ Voluntary Disclosure is Insufficient to Meet Investors’ Needs
Given these problems with the quality of voluntary ESG disclosure, notwithstanding the
efforts of public companies to meet investors’ needs, a wide range of capital market
participants have come out in favor of required ESG disclosure. In response to the Concept
Release, the SEC received comments from asset managers, institutional investors, individual
investors, foundation executives, and public pension funds, among others. These users of
corporate disclosure “overwhelmingly expressed support” for more required ESG disclosure.55
BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, with assets under management of $6.317
trillion as of March 31, 2018, has recognized the strategic value of ESG information:
Environmental, social, and governance issues are integral to our investment stewardship
activities, as the majority of our clients are saving for long-term goals. It is over the
long-term that ESG factors – ranging from climate change to diversity to board
effectiveness – have real and quantifiable financial impacts. Our risk analysis extends
across all sectors and geographies, helping us identify companies lagging behind peers
on ESG issues.56
And yet, BlackRock asserts that current reporting practices are insufficient for the kinds of
in-depth investment analysis that it seeks with its ESG integration, making it “difficult to
identify investment decision-useful data.” As a result, it has advocated for public policy
52

See David Levy, Halina S. Brown, & Martin de Jong, The Contested Politics of Corporate Governance: The Case
of the Global Reporting Initiative, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 88 (2010); see also Carl-Johan Hedberg & Fredrik von
Malmborg, The Global Reporting Initiative and Corporate Sustainability Reporting in Swedish Companies, 10
CORP. SOC. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 153 (2003).
53
See generally, Jody Grewal, Edward J. Riedl & George Serafeim, Market Reactions to Mandatory Nonfinancial
Disclosure, at 27 (Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-025, 2015),
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2657712 (stating that “firms having high ESG disclosure and stronger governance
performance will be able to institute the [EU Directive on non-financial reporting] more efficiently and costeffectively” because the reporting is mandatory, thus creating consistency).
54
See Chair Mary Jo White, Keynote Address at the 2015 AICPA National Conference: “Maintaining High-Quality,
Reliable Financial Reporting: A Shared and Weighty Responsibility,” Dec. 9, 2015, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/keynote-2015-aicpa-white.html; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, NonGAAP Financial Measures, Oct. 17, 2017, available at
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/nongaapinterp.htm.
55
Gellasch Joint Report, supra note 2, at 17.
56
See BlackRock, Viewpoint, Exploring ESG: A Practitioners Perspective (June 2016), available at
http://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-fi/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-exploring-esg-a-practitionersperspective-june-2016.pdf.
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changes to require companies to disclose such information, assuming appropriate safe harbors
are also provided.57
BlackRock is not alone among substantial asset owners and asset managers advocating for
better ESG disclosure in required securities filings. As discussed in Section Four, below, the
Human Capital Management Coalition, a group of 25 institutional investors representing $2.8
trillion in assets, has submitted a rulemaking petition to the Commission urging the adoption of
standards that would require listed companies to disclose information on human capital
management policies, practices, and performance.58 In July 2017, 390 investors representing
more than $22 trillion in assets wrote to G20 heads of state, calling on governments to “evolve
the financial frameworks required to improve the availability, reliability and comparability of
climate-related information.”59
Bloomberg, another global company that sells capital markets data, has reached conclusions
similar to those of BlackRock about the quality of ESG data. Since 2009, Bloomberg has
incorporated ESG data into the data that it sells to dealers, brokers, and investors around the
world.60 Even so, its CEO Michael Bloomberg has said this:
[F]or the most part, the sustainability information that is disclosed by corporations today
is not useful for investors or other decision-makers. . . .To help address this issue, I
became chair of the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) in 2014, and last
year [2015], I agreed to build on that work by chairing the new Task Force on ClimateRelated Financial Disclosures (TCFD)….The market cannot accurately value companies,
and investors cannot efficiently allocate capital, without comparable, reliable and useful
data on increasingly relevant climate-related issues….61
The Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) was constituted by the
Financial Stability Board, under the auspices of the G20.62 It has now released its final
recommendations for a framework of climate-relevant financial disclosure, focusing on four
aspects of a company’s operations in respect of climate change: Governance, Strategy, Risk
Management, and Metrics & Targets.63 Among what the TCFD calls its “key recommendations”
is that climate-related financial disclosures should be included in required financial filings, thus
that this type of reporting should be mandatory.64

57

Id.at 1.
http://uawtrust.org/hcmc.
59
https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/over-200-global-investors-urge-g7-stand-paris-agreement-anddrive-its.
60
See Bloomberg, Impact Report Update 2015 2, (2015), available at
http://www.bbhub.io/sustainability/sites/6/2016/04/16_0404_Impact_report.pdf.
61
Id.
62
The Task Force, chaired by Michael R. Bloomberg, was established by the FSB in December 2015 pursuant to a
request from Bank of England Governor Mark Carney “to develop a set of voluntary disclosure recommendations
for use by companies in providing information to investors, lenders and insurance underwriters about their climaterelated financial risks.” See https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/news/#.
63
See Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, June 2017, at iii, available at
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-TCFD-Report-062817.pdf [hereinafter “Task Force
Report”].
64
Id.
58
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Notwithstanding the problems with the quality of voluntarily produced ESG information in
the markets, the substantial growth in voluntary sustainability disclosure globally is important for
a number of reasons. First, companies are responding to investors who are increasingly aware of
the relevance of ESG data to a full evaluation of company strategies, risks, and opportunities.
This investor awareness shows the materiality of this information, particularly to shareholders
with a long-term orientation. Second, to produce sustainability reports companies have
developed internal procedures to collect and evaluate the kinds of information that an SEC
framework would likely require, thus showing that costs to companies should not be an
impediment. While not all companies have embarked on sustainability reporting, therefore
adoption will include some additional costs to some companies, the SEC is well-positioned to
provide “on-ramps” or differentiated requirements for smaller companies, as it has done
historically. Third, and perhaps most important, twenty-five years of development of voluntary
sustainability disclosure has not led to the production of consistent, comparable, highly-reliable
ESG information in the market, notwithstanding the voluntary, multi-stakeholder development of
a framework for disclosure (GRI) that is being used by 75% of the world’s largest companies.
SEC leadership providing a mandate for ESG disclosure in the world’s largest, and arguably
most important, capital market can significantly contribute to solving this problem.
5. Commission rulemaking will reduce the current burden on public companies and
provide a level playing field for the many American companies engaging in voluntary
ESG disclosure
In addition to benefiting investors, rulemaking regarding ESG disclosure would benefit
America’s public companies by providing clarity to them about what, when and how to disclose
material sustainability information. Today companies are burdened with meeting a range of
investor expectations for sustainability information without clear standards about how to do so.
A number of promising frameworks have been promulgated over the previous decade or decades,
many of which have been mentioned in this petition: GRI, SASB, CDP, and now TCFD being
the most prominent. And yet, because there isn’t clear guidance and an authoritative standard in
the U. S. for all public reporting companies to use, different companies are using different
frameworks and multiple mechanisms to disclose sustainability information. Thus, investors are
still dissatisfied with the comparability of sustainability information, even between companies in
the same industry.65
That ESG disclosure requirements could actually reduce burdens on America’s public
companies was well-stated in the CFA Institute’s Comment Letter to the Concept Release:
Many issuers already provide lengthy sustainability or ESG reports to their investors, so
many issuers will not face a new and burdensome cost by collecting, verifying and
disclosing ESG information. Costs may be saved if instead of producing large
sustainability reports that cover a broad range of sustainability information, issuers can
instead focus on only collecting, verifying and disclosing information concerning the
factors that are material to them and their investors.66
65

See PwC, Sustainability Disclosures: Is your company meeting investor expectations? (July 2015), cited in Jean
Rogers, SASB Comment Letter to the SEC’s April, 2016 Concept Release, July 1, 2016, at 7 fn.20 (79% of
investors polled said they were dissatisfied with the comparability of sustainability information between companies).
66
CFA Institute Comment Letter to the Concept Release, October 6, 2016, at 19. The CFA Institute is a global, notfor-profit professional association of over 137,000 investment analysts, advisers, portfolio managers, and other
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Such rulemaking would also act to create a level playing field between companies.
Today, sustainability information is being provided by some but not all companies, in formats
that differ, using different mechanisms for disclosure (sustainability reports, company websites,
SEC filings), and different timing. As recognized in an analysis of sustainability reporting by
PwC in 2016, this has created a situation where information is not comparable between
companies in the same industry and sector; where “an increasing volume of information is being
provided without linkage to a company’s core strategy,” and where there are no clear standards
all companies within the same industry are using.67 Such standards could well encompass a mix
of required elements, based on industry and sector; information about firms’ governance of
sustainability issues across industries; and principles-based elements to act as a materiality backstop. By providing clarity to issuers on what sustainability disclosure is required, the SEC would
create comparability between firms in the same industry, thus promoting a level playing field
between companies. Comparability will allow actual sustainability leaders to be recognized as
such, with attendant financial benefits such as increased investment and a lower cost of capital.68
6. Various ESG-related Petitions and Stakeholder Engagements with the SEC Suggest, in
Aggregate, that it is Time for the SEC to Act to Bring Coherence to this Area
In recent years, there have been a number of significant petitions and other investor proposals
seeking expanded disclosure of ESG information. These initiatives give evidence of the views of
investors and capital markets professionals that more needs to be done to meet investors’ needs
for consistent, comparable, and high-quality ESG data. Moreover, stakeholders have used
additional opportunities created by the SEC to support for broader ESG disclosure. A sampling
of such petitions, investor proposals, and stakeholder engagements includes:
Climate Risk Disclosure: In 2007 and 2009, Ceres filed petitions to the SEC calling for better
guidance to companies on how to disclose risks and opportunities from climate change. In 2010,
the SEC responded by issuing such guidance.69 Analysis indicates that the guidance has not been
successful in producing consistent, comparable, high-quality information concerning climate
change risks and opportunities, however.70 The Framework and Technical Guidance published
investment professionals in more than 157 countries. On the question of the SEC requiring sustainability disclosure,
the CFA Institute concluded that “[i]t is imperative that the SEC develop disclosure requirements that require
companies to disclose material sustainability information while allowing issuers the flexibility to disclose that which
is germane to their industry/sector . . . “ Thus the Institute supported differentiated sustainability disclosure
according to industry and sector, along with a general requirement for companies to disclose the corporate
governance arrangements for sustainability issues. Id.
67
PwC, Point of View: Sustainability reporting and disclosure: What does the future look like? (July 2016), at 1,
available at . https://www.pwc.com/us/en/cfodirect/publications/point-of-view/sustainability-reporting-disclosuretransparency-future.html.
68
See, e.g., Clark et al., supra note 29 (summarizing empirical literature through 2015, and finding that 90% of
studies show lowered cost of capital for firms with sound sustainability practices; 88% of studies show that better
E,S, or G practices (the latter specific to sustainability) result in better operational performance; and 80% of studies
show stock market out-performance for firms with good sustainability practices.
69
Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Release No. 33-9106; 34-61469; FR-82,
Feb. 8, 2010, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/339106.pdf.
70
See, e.g., Robert Repetto, It’s Time the SEC Enforced Its Climate Disclosure Rules, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (IISD)(Mar. 23, 2016), available at https://www.iisd.org/blog/it-s-time-secenforced-its-climate-disclosure-rules.
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by the FSB’s Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD), mentioned above,
would be an industry-developed (operating companies, investors, insurance companies, and
accounting) platform for the SEC to use as a starting point in promulgating its own Framework
for comprehensive ESG disclosure.
ESG Disclosure: On July 21, 2009, the U.S. Social Investment Forum (USSIF) requested that
the SEC promulgate a new, annual requirement for ESG disclosure, modeled on the framework
of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). GRI sets out a general framework for disclosure of
information applicable to all companies, and then industry-specific requirements relevant to the
social, environmental, and governance concerns applicable to each specific industry. The USSIF
petition also asked the SEC to issue interpretive guidance to clarify that companies are required
to disclose short and long-term sustainability risks in the Management Discussion and Analysis
section of their 10-K.
Gender pay ratios: On February 1, 2016, Pax Ellevate Management LLC, investment adviser
to the Pax Ellevate Global Women’s Index Fund submitted a petition to the Commission
requesting that it require public companies to disclose gender pay ratios on an annual basis.
Petitioners stated that “[w]e believe that pay equity is a useful and material indicator of wellmanaged, well-governed companies, and conversely, that companies exhibiting significant
gender pay disparities may bear disproportionate risk, and that investors therefore may benefit
from having such information.”71
Human Capital Management: On July 6, 2017, the Human Capital Management Coalition, a
group of institutional investors with $2.8 trillion in assets, submitted a petition to the
Commission requesting that it “adopt new rules, or amend existing rules, to require issuers to
disclose information about their human capital management policies, practices and
performance.”72 The Coalition seeks this expanded disclosure so that “(1) investors can
adequately assess a company’s business, risks and prospects; (2) investors can more “efficiently
direct capital to its highest value use, thus lowering the cost of capital for well-managed
companies; (3) companies can stop responding to a myriad of voluntary questionnaires seeking
this information; and (4) investors can pursue long-term investing strategies in order “to stabilize
and improve our markets and to effect the efficient allocation of capital.”
Human Rights: The human rights policies, practices, and impacts of filers are material to
many investors.73 The SEC has already provided for some human rights disclosure regarding
conflict minerals under 17 CFR §240.13p-1, in response to the Dodd-Frank Act, and in certain
guidance on disclosure relating to climate change74 and cyber-security information.75 General
guidance on disclosure of human rights policies, practices, and impacts is lacking, however.
71

See Pax Ellevate Petition, February 1, 2016, available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2016/petn4-696.pdf.
See Human Capital Management Coalition Petition, July 6, 2017, available at
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2017/petn4-711.pdf.
73
See, e.g., CYNTHIA WILLIAMS ET AL., “KNOWING AND SHOWING” USING U.S. SECURITIES LAWS TO COMPEL
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCLOSURE (Oct. 2013) at 16, available at http://icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ICARKnowing-and-Showing-Report4.pdf.
74
Securities & Exchange Comm’n, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change (Jan.
27, 2010), Release Nos. 33-9106; 34-61469; FR-82,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf [hereinafter Climate Change Guidance (2010)].
75
Securities & Exchange Comm’n, Division of Corporate Finance, CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2
Cybersecurity (2011), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm [hereinafter Cyber72

14

In responding to the 2016 Concept Release, a number of stakeholders provided comments on the
value of increased disclosure about a number of human rights issues. These comments
highlighted the need for better information about the impacts of companies on the human rights
of affected communities, but also discussed human rights impacts related to the environment,
climate change, human capital, and workforce issues. Over 10,000 commenters raised issues
within these different substantive areas.76 Additionally, in relation to Conflict Minerals rule,
when Acting Chairman Piwowar announced the SEC’s reconsideration of the rule’s
implementation in January 2017, the Commission received over 11,500 comments in support of
the rule—demonstrating strong stakeholder interest in its continued use.77
Political Spending Disclosure: On August 3, 2011, the Committee on Disclosure of
Corporate Political Spending (ten academics at leading law schools whose teaching and research
focus on corporate and securities law), petitioned the Commission to develop rules to require
public companies to “disclose to shareholders the use of corporate resources for political
activities.”78 Recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010), noted shareholder mechanisms to hold management to account for its use of corporate
funds to support political candidates, the petitioners argued that for that mechanism to work,
“shareholders must have information about the company’s political speech.”79 To date, this
petition has garnered more than 1.2 million comments of support, the most in the agency’s
history.80
Tax Disclosure: In its April 2016 Concept Release the SEC asked about what, if
anything, should be changed, updated, included or removed regarding tax disclosure. The
Comment Letter submitted by the Financial Accountability and Corporate Transparency (FACT)
Coalition emphasized that the role played by international tax strategies and rates on the
operations and earnings of many U.S. corporations is important and growing. The letter
highlighted the risks to investors created by these at best uncertain and often legally problematic
strategies. Given the scope of fines and risks arising from tax jurisdictions around the world,
investors need more information to be able to evaluate the scope of tax risks tht the company is
running. Moreover, the new tax law in the U.S. moves the U.S. to a territorial tax system, which
will open up further uncertainties and risks related to how and where revenues are booked.
The IRS recently finalized a rule to require country-by-country reporting of revenues, profits,
taxes paid and certain operations by larger multinational corporations. The European Union has
also established new country-by-country reporting requirements for larger firms doing business
in any of the member nations. Increasingly, tax authorities have access to this material
information, as do company managers, yet investors do not. The growing use of offshore tax
Security Guidance].
76
Gellasch Joint Report, supra note 2, at 10.
77
Comments on the Statement on the Commission’s Conflict Minerals Rule, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/statement-013117/statement013117.htm (last visited Jan.
25, 2018).
78
See Committee on Disclosure of Corporate Political Spending Petition, August 3, 2011, available at
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf.
79
Id. at 7.
80
See Comments on Petition to Require Public Companies to Disclose to Shareholders the Use of Corporate
Resources for Political Activities, available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2017/petn4-711.pdf (viewed
November 20, 2017),
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strategies, the international response to rein in aggressive tax avoidance, and the potential tax
liability for corporations engaged in these practices makes this information material for
investors.
These petitions, in conjunction with the large numbers of comments in support of expanded
sustainability disclosure in response to the SEC’s Concept Release, clearly show that investors
and capital market professionals think the time has come for the SEC to act to develop a
mandatory rule for clearer, consistent, comparable, high-quality ESG disclosure by all companies
subject to SEC public-reporting requirements.
Conclusion
We respectfully request the Commission to promptly initiate rulemaking to develop
mandatory rules for public companies to disclose high-quality, comparable, decision-useful
environmental, social, and governance information. If the Commission or Staff have any
questions, or if we can be of assistance in any way, please contact either Osler Chair in
Business Law Cynthia A. Williams, Osgoode Hall Law School, who can be reached at (416)
736-5545, or by electronic mail at cwilliams@osgoode.yorku.ca; or Saul A. Fox Distinguished
Professor of Business Law Jill E. Fisch, University of Pennsylvania Law School, who can be
reached at (215) 746-3454, or by electronic mail at jfisch@law.upenn.edu.
Sincerely,

Cynthia A. Williams
Osler Chair in Business Law
Osgoode Hall Law School
York University

Jill E. Fisch
Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of
Business Law
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Co-Director of Penn Law’s Institute for Law
and Economics

Additional signatories include:
Euan Stirling, Global Head of Stewardship & ESG Investing, Aberdeen Standard Investments
Amalgamated Bank
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)
Natasha Lamb, Managing Partner, Arjuna Capital
As You Sow
Boston Common Asset Management, LLC.
California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS)
John Streur, Chief Executive Officer, Calvert Research and Management
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Jim Coburn, Senior Manager, Disclosure, Ceres
Clean Yield Asset Management
Congregation of Sisters of St. Agnes
CtW Investment Group
Degas Wright, CFA, CEO/CIO, Decatur Capital Management, Inc.
New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli
Domini Impact Investments LLC
Holly A. Testa, Director, Shareowner Engagement, First Affirmative Financial Network
Illinois State Treasurer Michael W. Frerichs
Jeffery W. Perkins, Executive Director, Friends Fiduciary Corporation
The Fund for Constitutional Government
Green Century Capital Management
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility
Rabbi Joshua Ratner, Director of Advocacy, JLens Investor Network
JUST Capital
Clare Payn, Head of Corporate Governance North America, Legal & General Investment
Management
Luan Jenifer, Chief Operating Officer, Miller/Howard Investments, Inc.
The Missionary Oblates/ OIP
Morningstar, Inc.
Connecticut State Treasurer Denise L. Nappier
The Nathan Cummings Foundation
Natural Investments LLC
Bruce T. Herbert, AIF, Chief Executive, Newground Social Investment
NorthStar Asset Management, Inc.
Joseph F. Keefe, President, Pax World Funds
Province of Saint Joseph of the Capuchin Order (SJP)
Oregon State Treasurer Tobias Read
Rockefeller Brothers Fund
School Sisters of Notre Dame Cooperative Investment Fund
Jeffrey S. Davis, Executive Director, Seattle City Employees’ Retirement System
Frank Sherman, Executive Director, Seventh Generation Interfaith Inc.
Sanford Lewis, Director, Shareholder Rights Group
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The Sustainability Group of Loring, Wolcott & Coolidge
Trillium Asset Management, LLC.
Trinity Health
Tri-State Coalition for Responsible Investment
U.N. Principles for Responsible Investment
US SIF: The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment
Timothy Smith, Walden Asset Management/Boston Trust
Wallace Global Fund
Zevin Asset Management, LLC.
Securities law specialists
Professor Eric C. Chaffee
Professor of Law
The University of Toledo College of Law
Professor Wendy Gerwick Couture
Professor of Law
University of Idaho College of Law
Professor Aaron A. Dhir
Associate Professor
Osgoode Hall Law School
York University
Florence Rogatz Visiting Professor of Law & Oscar M. Ruebhausen Distinguished Senior
Fellow
Yale Law School
Professor Tamar Frankel
Professor Emerita of Law and Michaels Faculty Research Scholar
Boston University School of Law
Professor Donald C. Langevoort
Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law
Georgetown University Law Center
Professor Donna M. Nagy
Executive Associate Dean and C. Ben Dutton Professor of Law
Indiana University Maurer School of Law
Professor Lisa H. Nicholson
Professor of Law
University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of Law
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UBC Presidential Distinguished Professor
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Professor Jeff Schwartz
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Professor of Law
University of Denver Sturm College of Law
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Professor of Law
New York Law School
Professor Ciara Torres-Spelliscy
Leroy Highbaugh Sr. Research Chair and Professor of Law
Stetson University College of Law
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Professor of Law and Fellow, Center for Comparative and International Law
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